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Abstract
The payment field is being rapidly transformed. New players have emerged and are threatening the
well-established positions of the incumbents. This process is driven by technology change and market
forces, and it is shaped by the increasing role of the regulator. When considering the change in the
regulatory environment and combining it with the disruptive and innovative nature of the mobile
phone, the result is a market that is rapidly transforming from well-established structure into a state of
flux. We build a model to understand and explain this transformation of the digital payment
infrastructure. The model captures the formation and development of the digital payment
infrastructure with a particular emphasis on the regulator´s and innovator’s perspective. It consists of
four stages characterized by slow incremental change which are followed by short and rapid bursts of
discontinuity. Each stage is portrayed by its evolutionary dynamics, the nature of the payment
platform, the legal implications, the level of competition, and what drives the discontinuity.
Keywords: digital payments, multi-sided platform, EU payment regulation, digital infrastructures.
1 Introduction
There is little doubt that the payment field is being transformed. A significant role in this process is
played by the mobile phone which is going to upset the current equilibrium by demolishing well-
established business models and associated institutions while paving the way for new. Due to its
disruptive nature, the device is gradually eroding hard earned concessions and absorbing services that
previously were profitable. For example, consider that the mobile phone is in the midst of absorbing
navigation devices (GPS), mp3 players, and cameras as separate physical objects. The annexation
quest of the mobile phone propels forward and it has already set its target on digital payments (e.g.
Google Wallet, iZettle etc.).
Currently, domestic payment arenas are well-established, with predefined roles and profitable business
models. Payment fees, however, are about to become less profitable in the near future (European
Commission, 2013). At the same time novices in the payment landscape are challenging the status quo
of the payment market. The observed transformation, however, is not attributed only to the disruptive
nature of technology. It is also influenced and shaped by market forces and the growing intervention
of the regulators. The changes in the regulatory environment, combined with the disruptive nature of
the mobile phone, are transforming the well-established digital payment market. In this paper, we seek
to provide an answer to the following eminent research question which the payment industry faces
today:
How does digital payment infrastructure form and develop from innovator’s and regulator’s
perspective?
We present our answer as a framework that captures and portrays the formation and evolution of
digital payment infrastructures. This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present our theoretical
basis. In section 3, we conceptualize our model. In section 4, we discuss the model and its limitations
and make some conclusions.
2 Theoretical foundations
We aim to build a framework which identifies the different stages of the digital payment infrastructure
evolution, while at the same time analyzing the evolutionary dynamics from different perspectives. As
we recognize the complexity of the digital infrastructures, we adopt an interdisciplinary approach in
order to gain an in-depth understanding of the evolution in the digital payment market.
2.1 Infrastructure
There is an urgent need to theorize the evolution of digital infrastructures (Tilson et al., 2010). As
Henningsson and Hedman (2012) point out there are still many things about digital infrastructures and
how they can be developed towards specific ends that remain unknown. In particular, the area of the
digital payment infrastructure is understudied. The problem is investigated by Henningsson and
Hedman (2012) from organizational capabilities perspective. They, however, do not propose an
evolutionary model through which the infrastructure is established.
There is not enough research dedicated to the concrete evolutionary path through which digital
infrastructures grow. Some of the existing literature on digital infrastructure investigates the causal
structures of the evolution. Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) highlight the existence of three self-
reinforcing mechanisms (innovation (new services and products are created), adoption (more services
are offered and more users are attracted) and scaling (attracting partners to increase the reach of the
infrastructure)) that serve as causal powers in digital infrastructure evolution. Bygstad (2010)
identifies two self-reinforcing mechanisms (innovation and service) in information infrastructures
which feed on each other. Although these models recognize the complexity of the infrastructure
evolution, they exclude from their scope of analysis external factors which influence the development
such as the role of the regulator. Infrastructure is both relational and ecological (Star, 1999). Thus,
digital infrastructures are also investigated as relational models which are established and operated by
a heterogeneous collection of stakeholders drawn from both private and public organisations who
engage in various issues of collaboration, conflict and control (Elaluf-Calderwood, Herzhoff, Sorensen
and Eaton, 2011). The relationship between different stakeholders such as system builders,
entrepreneurs, regulators as a driver of the evolution of the wireless infrastructure is analyzed by
Lyytinen and Fomin (2002). They observe specific arrangements between the regulatory regime,
technological innovation and market forces. The analysis, however, does not reveal clearly the
interdependency between the three units of analysis, and it does not map the different stages of the
evolutionary path.
2.2 Platforms
It is acknowledged that the evolutionary complexity links digital infrastructure and digital platforms in
many ways (Sorensen, fortcoming). The interdependency between platforms and infrastructures,
however, is understudied. Digital infrastructures are usually being subjected to much more nebulous
control arrangements than digital platforms (Sorensen, forthcoming). Thus, infrastructures are much
more complex than platforms. For the purposes of this paper, we define digital infrastructures as
enablers of digital platforms. Thus, we investigate the digital payment solutions as digital payment
platforms which, as they grow and mature, slowly become integral part of the payment infrastructure.
At the same time, due to their disruptive nature, the digital platforms transform significantly the
existing payment infrastructure. In our view, a payment infrastructure encompasses physical payment
artifacts and the institutions that use and manufacture them as well as acquirers, banks, merchants and
citizens. It also encompasses relevant legislative and regulative bodies and trade and industry
associations that engage in the alignment of multiple interests including standards, fees and the
legitimization of the acceptable uses of the infrastructure.
In the existing literature it is recognized that a payments system functions as two-sided markets that
enable the interaction between both merchants and consumers (Rochet and Tirole, 2002; Evans and
Schmalensee, 2008). There is often confusion between the exact difference between one-sided, two-
sided, and multi-sided platforms. Part of the problem stems from the lack of a clear definition (Hagiu
and Wright, 2011). There is an overlapping in the way two-sided and multi-sided platforms are
defined (Evans and Schmalensee, 2008; Hagiu and Wright, 2011). In this paper, we propose a clear
distinction between one-sided platform, two-sided platform and multi-sided platform and demonstrate
how platforms develop and grow over time by adding new sides and functions to their initial value
preposition. Thus, we trace the evolution of the platform from one-sided and two-sided to multi-sided
(attracting more than two sides). In our model one-sided platforms differ from one-sided markets
which function predominantly as resellers (Hagiu and Wright, 2011). One-sided platforms facilitate
the communication between the users of the platform who form one distinctive group of consumers
which exhibit same-side network effects and have interchangeable roles. Thus, they differ from the
two-sided platforms which link two distinctive groups of users (consumers and merchants) with strong
cross-side network externalities.
The growth of the platforms is conditional upon several factors. The success of the platform depends
on the critical mass i.e. the number of the users on both sides has to reach a certain point (Evans,
2009). The critical mass influences market dynamics radically. Markets may grow slowly until
reaching a critical mass, then, suddenly, they can begin expanding rapidly (Osterberg and Thomson,
1998). Multi-sided platforms create value for their participants and profit for themselves by managing
network externalities (Evans, 2013). The establishment of strong same-side or cross-side network
effects increases the initial value preposition of the platform and allows for the development of pricing
models which enlarge the initial user base (Rochet and Tirole, 2002; Eisenmann et al., (2006)). After
bringing enough users on board, a platform owner should ensure the retaliation of the users by
managing the homing costs and the switching costs of the platform (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).
2.3 Evolutionary Economics theory
In our framework we assume that the process of evolution is triggered by technology disruption which
changes the number of actors and triggers new modes of interaction between them by transforming the
competitive dynamics of the environment. To capture the dynamics of the technology change and to
better explain its impact on the evolution, we rely on the evolutionary theory.
The concept of punctuated equilibrium stems from the evolutionary theory (Van Den Bergh and
Gwody, 2000). The evolution of species can occur either as gradualism or as punctuated equilibrium.
Change in gradualism is slow-paced, whereas in punctuated equilibrium, change comes in spurts, often
unexpectedly. Periods of very little change (or incremental change) are followed by few huge changes.
The concept of punctuated equilibrium is found to be particularly useful for explaining the dynamics
of technological change (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Technology
development is presented as an evolutionary process punctuated by rapid discontinuous change.
In the case of digital payments, we clearly observe the phenomenon of existing technologies being
applied in new application domain. To explain this, we adopt the biological notion of speciation which
states that new species evolve when they are isolated from their antecedent population. The analogue
of speciation in technological development is the use of existing technologies in a new domain of
application (Adner and Levinthal, 2002). The speciation triggers the evolution process. Thus, we
attribute the technological discontinuities (or the short periods of rapid discontinuous change) to re-
application of existing technologies in new application domain.
In this paper we also rely on the evolutionary perspective on dominant designs which focuses on
rivalry among alternatives. We adopt the concept of the dominant design as a product’s design
specifications (consisting of a single or a complement of design features) which define the product
category’s architecture (Christensen et al., 1998). The introduction of new technologies leads to a
rapid spread of different new designs which co-exist and enter into direct rivalry with old designs.
Over the time a dominant design emerges.
Lyytinen and Fomin (2002) point out the interdependency between technological artifacts, actors,
ideas and sites. Thus, the technology change has a clear impact on the relationship dynamics among
different actors. Of particular importance is the understanding that technology disruptions leads to the
emergence of new actors (companies) which change the competitive dynamics of the ecosystem. To
better investigate this claim and to guarantee consistency in the adopted theories, we rely on the
evolutionary economics which is based on the variation, selection and retention mode of evolution
(Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Metcalfe, 1998). The principle of evolution states that some entities (or in
our case companies), due to their specific characteristic, are better adapted to evolutionary pressure
than others. Variety is generated, and then the number of entities in the variety is decreased by a
selection process (Mayr, 1982). Relation between variation and selection is two-way; variety drives
selection and the development of variety is shaped by the process of selection.
2.4 Regulation
Lyytinen and King (2002) recognize that the reorganization of the regulatory regime and the
disruption of technologies are interlinked in multiple ways. In particular, most of the existing
frameworks for analyzing mobile payments (a field which is characterized by a high level of
technology disruption) also point out the importance of regulation (Au and Kauffman, 2008; Dahlberg
et al., 2008; Ondrus et al., 2009). Although most of these models recognize the role of the regulators
for shaping the environment, they view the impact of the regulation as static. We argue that regulation
has a dynamic nature and changes throughout the whole evolutionary process. Furthermore, regulation
not only follows the technology and market development, but also shapes the evolutionary process
whenever this is necessary. This complexity is not captured by the existing frameworks. Thus, our
paper aims at addressing this research gap. To this end, we try to map the development of the EU
payment legislation which shapes the Single Payment Market, and in particular SEPA as the initiative
is perceived as a cornerstone for the achievement of full payment market integration. SEPA is a form
of European hybrid governance where traditional hard law, soft law and privately constructed rules
interact (Janczuk-Gorywoda, 2012). In this term, we view SEPA as a legislation effort and not as a
final result, namely the establishment of SEPA infrastructure. We then try to test whether our model
can serve as a predictive tool for estimation of the possibility (regulation or not) and the degree (more
or less regulation) of future legislative efforts on EU level.
3 Crafting the Digital Payment Infrastructure Evolution (DPIE)
model
As indicated above we try to build a framework which identifies the different stages of digital payment
infrastructure evolution by analysing the evolution from several perspectives, namely multi-sided
platforms, evolutionary theory and regulation. We build on the notion adopted by Tilson et al. (2010)
who claim that digital infrastructures can be characterised in terms of paradoxical relations between
both stability and change, and generativity and control. To further explain this, we incorporate the
notions of technological discontinuities and incremental change as stated in the Tushman – Rosenkopf
cyclical model of technological change (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). Thus, our model states that
the evolution of the digital payment infrastructures is not stable and slow-paced but rather a dynamic
process which combines periods of incremental change and stability with rapid, short-term disruptions.
Our model defines 4 phases of evolution (invention, early commercial launch, full commercial launch
and establishment of new infrastructure) which are intercepted by several discontinuities (technology
disruption (speciation), formulation of a successful business model and emergence of a dominant
design) (fig.1). Thus, our model recognizes the presence of several discontinuities which accelerate the
development and are the source of major change in the evolution process. The discontinuities are not
self-driven. They are a result (or natural continuation) of the specific development dynamics which
characterize each stage of the evolution. This development dynamic within each stage is influenced
and shaped by the growth of the payment platforms (multi-sided platform), the change in the
configuration of the actors (evolutionary economics), and the role of the regulation.
3.1 Phase 1 Invention
The invention stage is a period of inventing new technologies or processes. Sometimes this is done
without a specific application in mind or the invention turns out not to be useful for what it was first
intended. Many technologies, therefore, can be characterized as dormant. They have disruptive
potential but first they need to be unlocked. A good example of this is the ATM which was created in
1939 by Luther Simijan. After six months of trails the bank reported that there was no need or demand
for such a product (Barwise and Meehan, 2011). It was not until almost thirty years later, a second
attempt to popularize the ATM was made and this time the invention became widespread. The genesis
of the ATM shows common characteristics of inventions as many are invented long before they
became widespread.
In the area of digital payments the technologies which allow the execution of digital payments (e.g.
NFC, QR codes, etc.) were first developed and applied to markets other than the payment market.
Later, they were introduced to the digital payment field. Even though they were subjected to some
adaptations, we do not witness a significant, radical modification of these technologies. Thus, the
technologies, which enable the digital payments today, are borrowed from other fields.
In this paper, we argue that this happens during the first discontinuity which is triggered by a shift in
the application domain of a particular technology (speciation). We argue that the shift is caused when
a specific technology manages to get the attention of a given actor.
Figure 1. The Digital Payment Infrastructure Evolution Source: Authors’ creation
This speciation usually results when a technology is taken from one niche and put into another market
niche. The new technology then has an evolutionary path of its own and can soon penetrate an existing
mass market. This, however, happens at a later stage. First the technology has to exit the originating
niche (or exit the first discontinuity). Niches are seen as incubator rooms where innovation can evolve
protected from the mainstream market selections (Hjelholt and Damsgaard, 2013). Actors select the
particular invention due to the belief that it can support or enhance their position and increase their
power. To exit the niche an institutional actor or a company has to test the market potential of the
selected technology. Thus, the niche innovation is offered as a service in the market, often on a trial
basis. After a pilot is completed, the actor evaluates the results and decided whether to launch the
innovation or not in the next stage – early commercial launch. Thus, the exit of the niche depends on
the results from the pilot.
Most of the existing solutions in this stage are offered as one-sided platforms (Barclays’ Pingit,
Danske Bank’s MobilePay) which combine one or few features and target one distinct group of users
who exhibit strong same-side network effects. As the pilot period is associated with many
uncertainties, companies usually try to test a service or a product with limited functionalities which
will allow them to attract the attention of various consumers. Combining too many functions at this
stage will increase the investment costs of the company. At the same time as the market is not fully
understood, it is hard to predict the exact demand for particular functionalities.
As claimed above technology innovation can disrupt the existing ecosystem by bringing new players,
and thus it complicates the relational dynamics. In this first phase, we identify two main players -
incumbents and new entrants (e.g. start-ups using new technologies). There are established payment
solutions offered by regulated financial institutions (banks, credit card companies). Most of the
customers are locked-in the old payment systems. The new entrants offer either better alternative
solutions or completely new payment solutions. The customers, however, are still not locked-in. As a
result regulators have no clear mandate to legislate because the new technology may not lift–up. We
define this phase as a regulatory gap which is characterized by high level of regulatory asymmetry
(some entities are covered by specific legal requirements, while others are not). The asymmetry is
further enhanced by the different levels of competitive advantages between incumbents and new
entrants. Since the contenders do not have to comply with the same regulatory requirements which
banks, for example, face, they have more freedom to operate. However, they also face high level of
regulatory uncertainty as they do not know what approach the regulator might take it the future.
Therefore, there is a high risk that the gained competitive advantage may be neutralized by too
rigorous regulation introduced at a later stage. In this first stage, we argue that the role of the regulator
is to find the right balance between ensuring innovation and guaranteeing fair competition.
Furthermore, regulation at this stage can be seen as a barrier to entry if the compliance is too high and
costly. This partly explains the wait-and-see approach adopted by the regulators.
3.2 Phase 2 Early Commercial Launch
The second stage is characterized by the early commercial launch of the payment solution. The main
aim of this stage is to guarantee the growth of the product/service by increasing the user base i.e.
reaching a critical mass. A popular way to attract first-time visitors is to offer gifts, subsidies or
discounts (Damsgaard, 2002). Being able to achieve a critical mass is the threshold for the adoption of
a new technology or a payment service. If a critical mass is not reached, the specific payment solution
just dies out. There are many examples of launched mobile payment solutions which were discarded
after they failed to attract the necessary user base, f.e. Bart in Sweden, O2 Wallet in UK etc. The
critical mass indicates the presence of a stable user base which is entrenched in the service/product.
The entrenchment is further enhanced by adding new functionalities to the already existing payment
solution. The large user base attracts a second distinct group of users (i.e. merchants) who are ready to
pay to get an access to the consumers. Thus, a payment solution is transformed from one-sided
platform to two-sided platform. This development changes the evolutionary dynamics and leads to the
second discontinuity where, now as the solution has proven its value, a company has to decide on its
viable business model.
The critical mass concept has very important implications for the competition in the digital payment
markets. The speciation of various technologies during the previous stage leads to variation in the
offerings (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). We claim that variation begins after a company decides to
shift a specific technology or innovation to a new domain of application and offers it commercially.
This act spurs variation in the new niche. These innovations lead to the emergence of many new
entities, which enter into an environment previously inhabited only by incumbents, and thus giving
rise to specific variation. It is important to note here that in the digital payment area the variation
comes from the various existing technologies re-applied to this market from other domains ( NFC, QR
codes), as well as from the institutional actor or companies who choose them (e.g. many new entrants
offer NFC-based payment solutions in various forms). The number of the new entrants is usually
growing faster and the interaction with the other actors in the environment (new entrants and
incumbents alike) is chaotic.
Since the regulator does not have a clear mandate to legislate after the introduction of new
technologies, new entrants are left operating in a legal void without clear guidance to adhere to. As a
response to this, many industry players form self-regulatory bodies which develop a common set of
standards and business rules applicable to all of its members. The main goal is to gain a cohesive voice
in the industry and to seek membership with influential bodies which can shape policy-making
decisions.
The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) is probably the most ambitious self-regulatory project aimed
at creating an integrated European digital payments market since the introduction of the Euro (Allix et
al., 2009). The starting point for the SEPA project can be traced back to the adoption of Regulation
2560/2001 on cross-border payments in Euro which introduced the principle of equal charges for
cross-border and domestic payments. But the Regulation itself was not sufficient to accomplish EU
payment market integration. Instead, the Regulation was a clear signal to the banking industry to fill
this apparent void by introducing technical standards (Janczuk-Gorywoda, 2012). In 2002, banks and
banking associations established the European Payment Council (EPC) as a decision-making body of
the European banking industry with the main purpose to support and promote SEPA. We argue that at
this stage SEPA has all the characteristics of a typical self-regulation initiative. Thus, during the phase
of the early commercial launch the regulator prefers to encourage self-regulatory initiatives instead of
introducing hard law. Although self-regulation can be seen as a step towards regulatory symmetry as it
tries to fill the regulatory void, the levels of asymmetry still remain high. We attribute this to the
voluntarily nature of the self-regulation which, in contrast to regulation, does not have binding force.
Therefore, the decision to join or not a particular regulatory initiative is left to the discretions of the
companies. The asymmetry is also attributed to the uncertain future of the new payment technologies
and payment services. Until new technology reaches a critical mass, the levels of competition remain
low and there is no particular need to regulate it. Before passing the critical mass test, the future of the
new payment services seems unstable and insecure.
3.3 Phase 3: Full Commercial Launch
In the full commercial launch phase digital payment solutions converge and transform from two-sided
into multi-sided platforms by attracting more sides and adding more functions to their initial value
preposition. The full commercial launch phase is characterized by intensive competition between
incumbents and new entrants as well as between new entrants themselves. Thus, as a preparation for
the severe competition, a payment solution has to increase its value preposition, and thus indirectly to
increase its switching and homing costs. During this stage different payment solutions fight to become
the dominant actor in the market. Often solutions will be in direct competition over the same users
(Hjelholt and Damsgaard, 2013). According to the model proposed by Tushman and Rosenkoph the
period of intense competition ends with the selection of a dominant design which we understand as the
specification (consisting of a single design feature or configuration of design features) that defines the
product category’s architecture (Christensen et al., 1998). The end of the battle comes with the
establishment of one or several dominant designs. Therefore, we witness a significant decrease in the
number of solutions. The establishment of a new dominant design constitutes the third discontinuity in
our model.
From evolutionary economics perspective, while innovation is about creating new variations, selection
puts them to test. Selection reduces the variety by giving preference to some forms of variation rather
than to others (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). Competition is selection undertaken in a market environment
the outcome of which is economic change (Metcalfe, 1998). Selection is tight to the concept of
Darwinian “fitness” which states that the fittest variations will survive, while the unfit ones will
perish. In economic terms “fitness” is equalized with economic efficiency. The variations which
generate profit and can capture a significant market share are deemed fit to be the true winners.
If, in this stage, the regulatory asymmetry is still present, the legal incoherence can turn out to be a
very important tool in this battle. The longer a new entrant stayed unregulated after it has reached
critical mass, the more competitive advantage it will enjoy over its regulated competitors because it is
not subject to regulatory burdens.  Although the early commercial stage was primarily dominated by
self -regulation, this mechanism seems not to be very useful in the later full commercial launch phase.
The main reason for this is the fact that self-regulation is not suitable for stages with high level of
competition because of its voluntary nature. In this stage, characterized by heated battle for
dominance, the regulatory void, due to the lack of any particular regulation, can pose significant
threats to the proper functioning of the market. The role of the regulators here is to ensure consumer
protection and fair competition (or level playing field for all the actors). This cannot be achieved by
the EPC alone or by any other self-regulatory association. Therefore, the European Commission
decided to adopt the Payment Service Directive (PSD) in 2007 which serves as a legal framework for
SEPA. Thus, the PSD changes the self-regulatory nature of SEPA to a hybrid form where soft law and
hard law interact to address different issues. This presents an interesting development in the EU
regulator’s approach in regulating the payment area as it indicates for increased regulatory
intervention. At the same time the PSD introduces a new licensing regime for payment service
providers (PSPs) who offer limited amount of payment services (Payment Institutions). Thus, new
entities are brought into the regulatory scope. The asymmetry, however, is still present as the different
PSPs continue to be governed by different rules (different licensing regimes for Payment institutions,
E-money Institutions, Credit institutions).
3.4 Phase 4: Infrastructure
In the final stage, the development slows down as a well-defined and mature payment infrastructure is
established. The digital platform, which is selected after the severe competition, becomes integral part
of the infrastructure, and thus of a well-established, stable regime. At the same time the existing
infrastructure is transformed as it is now dominated by a new player. The ability of the winner to
innovate is seriously restrained as it cannot fully absorb new inventions on constant basis. The winner
has established user base, successful business model and high lock-in effects. Therefore, there is little
incentive to innovate as the main efforts are focusing on preserving the leadership position by
retaining the already gained market share. As a result of its victory, the winner is granted a concession
to establish its own infrastructure (either as part of the existing one, or a completely new one). This
usually allows the winner to exclude other competitors and new entrants from accessing the newly
established infrastructure and to raise the barriers to entry.
The establishment of a stable infrastructure is also connected to a change in the regulatory approach.
Soft law and self-regulation both work as preliminary or complimentary stages of hard law (Gonçalves
and Gameiro, 2008). There are still some doubts about their effectiveness as regulatory instruments.
They are often designed to promote more participation and dialogue, but sometimes they are also
perceived as lacking transparency and accountability. This discussion can be seen in the evolution of
SEPA. In 2013, the European Commission adopted Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European
Parliament and of the Council establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and
direct debits in euro (SEPA Regulation). The reason for this is that the self-regulatory efforts of the
European banking sector through the SEPA initiative have not proven sufficient to drive forward
concerted migration to Union-wide schemes for credit transfers and direct debits on both the supply
and the demand side (para 5 of the SEPA Regulation).
We argue that, with the adoption of the SEPA Regulation, the hybrid governance mode of SEPA has
changed towards hard law. SEPA is no longer a voluntarily initiative, but a regulatory requirement
(Deutsche Bank, 2012). Due to the inability of the EPC to ensure fast adoption of the SEPA
Rulebooks in the countries of the SEPA area, a stricter, more hierarchic approach is needed. This
development in the EU payment legislation signals that as the platforms mature and established
infrastructures emerge, the regulator has more incentives to intervene and regulate the development of
the area. The evolution of SEPA indicates a general trend towards more regulation in the EU payment
area. For the past decade there has been a growing discussion around the changing character of the EU
legislative approach. The regulatory reform has aimed at establishing a “new mode of governance” by
combining traditional hard law with more alternative legislative forms such as in the soft law and co-
regulation. However, we argue that, at least in the digital payment area, although we have observed a
variety of self-regulatory initiatives, we are about to see the introduction of more regulation. The
newly proposed “Payments Legislative Package” is a clear indicator of this development (European
Commission, 2013).
As our model has a cyclical nature, this phase of slow incremental growth coincides with the first
stage. The winner of the selection process has established itself as a dominant market player, but, as
noted above, this has restricted its ability to innovate. This creates opportunities for new players to
come up with new innovations which has the potential to disrupt the market. Thus, this last stage of
the evolution ends when a new speciation process is triggered.
4 Conclusions and Discussions
In this paper we have built a model that describes and explains the formation and development of
digital payment infrastructure. To that end, we rely on the combination of number of theories and
regulatory frameworks, namely regulation, multi-sided platforms, evolutionary economics. The key
characteristics of our model are summarized in Table 1.
We identify 4 different stages of digital payment infrastructure evolution. The invention phase triggers
a process of speciation where a new product or a service is applied in another domain. This disrupts
the old domain and leads to an invasion of new entities. The variation of companies, which
characterizes the early commercial launch, is put down to selection during the next stage. In the final
phase (the establishment of infrastructure), the selected winner tries to retain its position and to raise
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Table 1. Overview of the key characteristics of the DPIE model
The level of competition also varies during the different stages of the model.  The invention stage is
characterized by low level of competition as the new entrants are yet to test the market potential of
their inventions. Therefore, we define the platform as one-sided since the new product or service is
still developing. As the platform becomes two-sided during the next stage, the level of competition
slowly rises, but the preference is given to cooperation. The competition intensifies as the platform
matures and becomes multi-sided. After the selection the established winner faces low level of
competition and tries to retain its dominant position by integrating more products or services to the
already existing payment solutions (bundling).
In this paper we claim that the regulator’s role changes over time as the digital payment infrastructure
develops. At the beginning the regulator tends to adopt a wait-and-see approach in order to estimate
the development of the market. But as the market evolves and matures, the regulator tends to increase
its intervention in order to guarantee adequate consumer protection and fair competition. The main
impact of the EU regulation is to open up the EU payment market for new players which will bring
more competition and foster banks to innovate their services and products. Innovation will bring more
choice and lower prices for the end consumer. At the same time regulation has a negative impact on
the incumbents as they have to unbundle their infrastructure. A good example of this is the Payment
Initiation Service and the Account Information Service in the context of the Proposal for Amendment
of the PSD (PSD2, 2013). By ensuring the entrance of new players and by reducing the dominant
power of banks, the EU regulator aims at creating a level playing field for the EU payment market.
This, undoubtedly, leads to the introduction of more regulation in the payment sector.
Our contributions to the existing literature are several. We recognize that the source of innovation in
the digital payment market comes mainly from re-application of already existing technologies to the
payment field. We provide a theoretical explanation of this phenomenon and its impact on the further
evolution of the payment market by linking it to the concept of speciation. Our model also tries to
provide a clear distinction between one-sided, two-sided and multi-sided platforms and to trace the
growth of the platform as part of the digital payment infrastructure. Lastly, we see regulation as a
dynamic concept which develops over time. The change in the regulatory approach has a clear impact
on the digital payment infrastructure.
The DPIE model is designed as an idealized model. In reality, there are many solutions at different
stages of the model. This also indicates that timing the launch of a solution with appropriate type of
regulations can decide its faith. If it is too late, the regulatory window of opportunity may have shut. If
it is too early, the incumbents will have the regulatory upper hand in the form of a (de-facto)
concession. Validation of the model can be achieved by testing its explanatory power in describing
historical accounts of attempts to establish payment infrastructures. In a more prescriptive mode, the
model could be tested by its ability to offer guidelines to companies as what to expect and do next
when they are jockeying for a position for their solution in the digital payment market.
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